Rules of Criminal Procedure: The Background of Draftsmanship by France, James G.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1974
Rules of Criminal Procedure: The Background of
Draftsmanship
James G. France
University of Akron School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
James G. France, Rules of Criminal Procedure: The Background of Draftsmanship, 23 Clev. St. L. Rev. 32 (1974)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss1/34
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
The Background of Draftsmanship
James G. France*
W HILE OHIO'S RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, effective July 1, 1973,
are entirely new to the criminal law practitioners, it is not the
purpose of this article to point out the difference between the present
and the past in terms of how a criminal case should be prepared for
trial and tried. Rather, the emphasis here is on the background of
formulation of the rules in terms of Ohio's experience both in draft-
ing rules and in borrowing and adapting rules from other fields, from
other jurisdictions, and sometimes from other generations to achieve
what the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio has described
as the most advanced practices in the nation.'
Ohio Rulemaking Before 1968
There is some disposition to believe that the Supreme Court of
Ohio, before 1968, had no rule making power to control the procedural
conduct of the trial courts, and that all power and all experience in
the field had to be acquired subsequent to the co-called Modern Courts
Amendment to article IV of the state constitution in that year. Such
a statement is not altogether accurate, at least so far as the civil
operations of the common pleas courts of the state were concerned.
For many years the Supreme Court, as a part of its own rules of pro-
cedure, carried a provision regulating continuances for trial in those
courts.2 There was no apparent attempt to enforce the rule or even
to publicize it for the information of the courts concerned. The pro-
vision was quietly deleted from the Court's rules in 1964, four years
before the constitutional grant of rule making and supervisory power
to the Supreme Court.3 Whether the occasion and the reason for the
deletion was its patent lack of effectiveness, or part of a covert prep-
aration for publicizing the great need for achieving an express grant
of the power, is not easily ascertainable. No recorded statement of
the reasons for the deletion was ever published.
*A.B., Brown University; L.L.B., Yale University; Professor, University of Akron School of
Law; former Judge, Ohio Court of Appeals, Seventh Appellate District.
1State of the Judiciary Message, 46 OHIO BAR 755, 766 (1973), delivered at the Ohio State
Bar Association Convention, Dayton, Ohio, May 28, 1973.
2 OHIO SUPREME COURT RULE XXV, dealing with this problem in the Courts of Appeals as
well, had appeared in the Published Rules Other than those Peculiar to the Supreme Court
since 94 Ohio St. (1917). The rule disappeared in the revision published in 176 Ohio St.
(1964).
3 OHIO CONST. art. IV §5 (B), as enacted May 7, 1968.
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In theory, however, the Supreme Court still maintained a species
of control over trial court rules through an assumed power to ap-
prove or disapprove local court rules as they were adopted by the
various trial courts and filed with the Supreme Court.4 The power
was not discernably exercised on any administrative or supervisory
basis, but only as the adherence to and reliance on their own local
rules by the trial courts were assigned as errors of law during the
course of appeal. One such rule, by the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas, would have reduced the number of civil jurors serv-
ing in a case from twelve to six in certain civil cases. The Court, on
appeal by the plaintiff from an adverse verdict at the hands of a
six-man jury, struck down the local rule as unconstitutional in 1935.1
This was a generation before the adoption and approval of a much
more stringent rule by the Butler County court,6 and before the adop-
tion of almost identical provisions by the Supreme Court on a uni-
form, compulsive basis in Ohio's 1970 Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Rules of Superintendence which followed.7 Other local rules were
reviewed in the same manner but inferentially, as the various Courts
of Appeal approved or rejected the local rules and the Supreme Court
declined to extend the opportunity for further review.8 The bulk of
such rules dealt with trial practice or trial scheduling, but a few dealt
with matters of pleading or discovery,9 and the local rules themselves
became so numerous and detailed that published collections of them
were made and sold to practitioners.
The common pleas court local rules were the product, like the
Supreme Court's early lonesome venture, of an assumed or inherent
power to regulate practice. There was neither a constitutional nor a
statutory grant of express power for their adoption with respect to
the courts of general jurisdiction in the state. In this respect, Ohio's
prevalent form of limited jurisdiction court of record, the municipal
courts, had a distinct advantage. As in most states, the municipal
courts were created in hodge-podge fashion as local need arose, some
4 Few common pleas courts chose to file their rules with the Court, but they were encouraged
to do so by the then Administrative Assistant to the Supreme Court, predecessor of the Ad-
ministrative Director.
5 Cleveland Ry. v. Halliday, 127 Ohio St. 278, 188 N.E. 1 (1933); cf. Meyer v. Brinsky, 129
Ohio St. 371, 195 N.E. 702 (1935); State ex rel. Wilke v. Newton, 125 Ohio St. 640, 186
N.E. 94 (1932).
6 Cassiday v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 231 N.E.2d 64 (1967); see Dailey v. State, 4 Ohio
St. 57 (1854).
7 OHio R. Cirv. P. 38(B).
8 Brown v. Mossop, 139 Ohio St. 24, 37 N.E.2d 98 (1941); Van Ingen v. Berger, 82 Ohio
St. 255, 92 N.E. 433 (1910); Simmons v. Stare, 75 Ohio St. 346, 79 N.E. 555 (1906).
9See, e.g., Household Finance Corp. v. Stacey, 118 Ohio App. 75, 188 N.E.2d 65 (1963),
requiring specific rather than general denials in answers to claims on commercial paper; cf.
Bognar v. Cleveland Quarries Co., 7 Ohio App.2d 187, 219 N.E.2d 827 (1966), dealing
with mass pre-trial rules.
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with extensive rule making power, some with little, and some entirely
without it. In 1951, the legislature did create a more or less uniform
minor court structure in a general Municipal Court Act with its civil
pleading rules governed by those imposed by statute on the common
pleas courts. The Act included specific authority to adopt court rules
in aid thereof.10 Many of the courts took advantage of the rule mak-
ing power thus conferred to adopt specific court rules in aid of the
statutory procedure. Generally these municipal court rules were more
sweeping, better coordinated, and more detailed than the common
pleas court rules had been. But it was in the criminal practice area
that real improvements by rule making were made. The municipal
court criminal practice was not governed (as was civil practice) by
the antiquated statutory common pleas court procedure designed for
felony trials. It was rather governed by that provided for another
type of state limited jurisdiction tribunal, the now almost-vanished
police courts," and in default of such provision, by justice of the peace
procedure. There was no need, however, for the municipal courts to
fall back upon the procedure of the squires, since the legislature had
thoughtfully provided the police courts with full rule making power
in determining their procedure. 2 As a result, many of the more pro-
gressive municipal courts took full advantage of the borrowed power
so provided them, and prior to 1960 instituted a system of motion
practice similar to that of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
in substitution for the ritualized motion to quash and demurrer sys-
tem specified for felony trials in the common pleas courts. Some courts
also set simplified bail bonding schedules and procedures. 3 Some even
used the rule making device to adopt the American Bar Association's
Uniform Traffic Ticket affidavit forms in substitution for plain form
affidavits and warrants in traffic cases as previously used. 4
The free use of the rule making power by municipal courts in
criminal matters, with its attendant variety among the courts and
disparity of rule output, was somewhat restricted in 1960 by new
10 Ohio Municipal Court Act, created by S.B. 14, 1951, OHIO GEN. CODE, §§1581-1617
(1951). Rule making authority is now conferred in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1901.13 (c)
(Page 1968).
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1901.21(A) (Page 1968). By 1967 all of the once numerous police
courts in Ohio, except that in Ottawa Hills, Lucas County, had been converted to municipal
courts.
1 2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1903.16 (Page 1968).
13The motion practice thus instituted was codified and made uniform by S.B. 73, 128 LAWS
OF OHIO 97 (1959) amending various sections of Chapter 2937, OHIO REV. CODE, partic-
ularly §2937.04. For a description of the effect, see Willoughby v. Hugebeck, 2 Ohio App.2d
36, 38, 206 N.E.2d 234, 235 (1964).
14 In some cases the results were unfortunate as courts uncritically adopted forms with jurats or
specifications designed for use in other jurisdictions and defective under Ohio law. See In-
formal Opinion No. 50 of Attorney General to the Director of the Ohio Dept. of Highway
Safety, Jan. 6, 1958; Willoughby v. Hugebeck, 2 Ohio App.2d 36, 206 N.E.2d 234 (1964),
discussed in France, The Ohio Supreme Court's Traffic Court Rules: A Beginning of Pro-
cedural Rule-Making, 1 AKRON L.REv. 1, 10 (1968).
[Vol. 23:32
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legislation." The legislation itself was no mere piece of cancellation
of an existing power. Drawn and sponsored by the Ohio State Bar
Association's criminal law committee, the new act rewrote much of
Ohio's then century-old law dealing with arrest and detention, ar-
raignment before the magistrates, and preliminary hearings in felony
matters.16 It also enacted an entirely new chapter of the Ohio Revised
Code dealing with the trial of misdemeanors before the limited juris-
diction courts.17 Many of the provisions of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure were adopted in statutory form.18 The federal plea of
nolo contendere was adapted for use in misdemeanor cases, translated
into English, given a slightly changed definition and a different thrust
as a new (to Ohio) plea of no contest.19 The old forms of special plead-
ing were abolished, and motion practice similar to that of Federal
Criminal Rule 12 was substituted for them. Bail provisions were col-
lected from many disassociated chapters of the Ohio Revised Code
and simplified, as were the procedures for collecting on forfeited bail.
The former vice of prosecution by private attorney for the complain-
ing witness was eliminated, and the much-condemned practice of trial
of misdemeanors by the mayors' courts was restricted by liberal (but
mandatory) provisions for transfer of contested cases to limited juris-
diction courts of record. The American Bar Association type of traffic
ticket affidavit was expressly sanctioned and the use of warrants in
connection with it made entirely unnecessary.
The changed statutory procedure could perhaps be criticized in
one respect. It was a legislatively-designed procedure, not a sweeping
grant of rule making power to the Supreme Court for devising the
provisions in rule form. But there seemed at that time to be no ap-
petite on the part of the Ohio Supreme Court to indulge in rule
making; the makeup of the Ohio high bench did not seem conditioned
to the civil libertarianism marked by the Federal Rules.20 Instead
there was introduced, as something of a challenge to the Court, a pair
of statutory provisions that permitted it to adopt uniform rules of
practice "not inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter 2937 of
the Revised Code" governing practice and procedure in criminal cases
in courts of limited jurisdiction.1 The power to impose these rules
15 S.B. 73, 128 LAWS OF OHIO 97 (1959). A pre-introduction annotation and commentary ap-
pears in 41 OHIO BAR 422-46 (1968).
16 S.B. 73, 128 LAWS OF OHIO 97 (1959). The changes are summarized in McGovern, 1959
Legislation Affecting the Minor Courts, 20 OHIO ST.L.J. 623, 629-637 (1959).
17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2938 (Page Supp. 1972).
78 Rules 10, 11, 12 were followed essentially in amended §§2937.03, 2937.06, 2937.04 OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1972), respectively.
19 For discussion of differences between the two pleas, see McGovern, supra note 16, at 632.
20 As to reasons for this attitude, see France, The Ohio Supreme Court's Traffic Court Rules.: A
Beginning of Procedural Rule-Making, 1 AKRON L.REv. 1, 2-7 (1968).
1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2935.17 and 2937.46 (Page Supp. 1972).
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went unused for nearly eight years after the effective date of the
legislation,22 and very nearly to the date of passage of the Modern
Courts Amendment to Ohio's constitution, with its grant of full rule
making power.
It is perhaps noteworthy that while criminal procedure is the
last of the various areas to be covered by the blanket of constitutionally
authorized uniform rules imposed by the Supreme Court under its
Modern Courts grant of authority, 23 it was the first area in which the
Court took the opportunity to engage in the draftsmanship of uni-
form rules. It is true that the area was a comparatively narrow one:
filling in the omissions of the statutory plan for the preliminary hear-
ing of felonies, and for the arraignment of defendants to be tried for
misdemeanors in the limited jurisdiction courts. Admittedly this is
not the most glamorous area of rule making operations. It was not,
however, as narrow an area as the Court itself eventually described
it. While the rules finally evolved, purported by title to be concerned
only with traffic cases, and are officially referred to as the Uniform
Traffic Rules, both the grant and the exercise of the rule making
power are far broader.24 Many of the detailed provisions relating to
forms of pleading, the use of referees and of violation bureaus, indeed
relate purely to traffic cases. But the provisions for arraignment of
defendants, for the filing and consolidation of pretrial (and pre-plea)
motions, for the application of the canons of judicial ethics to the lay
judges, for the transfer of cases, and for the required personal ap-
pearance on entry of plea, by their terms, relate not merely to traffic
offenses but to all misdemeanor prosecutions.
The principal difficulty in securing the adoption of these supple-
mentary rules, as precursors of a uniform rule system in Ohio, lay
not in any difficulty in drafting them, but in convincing the Court of
the desirability of their adoption. Most of the rules which gave rise
to difficulty were those which were merely slight adaptations of the
time-tested New Jersey and Missouri rules dealing with the traffic
ticket. It was to these changes that police agencies took greatest ex-
ception.25 By contrast, those rules imposing motion practice and the
consolidation of pre-trial motions for hearing drew very little argu-
ment. But the timing was wrong for disputes with police agencies
over their prerogatives. The Ohio Supreme Court had just decided
2 The rule making power became effective January 1, 1960, the effective date of S.B. 73, 128
LAWS OF O-IO 97 (1959). The rules were promulgated December 4, 1967.
23 Preceding the criminal rules were the civil rules (1970), appellate rules (1971), superin-
tendence rules (1971), government of the bar rules (amended, 1971) and juvenile rules
(1972). First draft of the juvenile rules was published in 44 OHIO BAR 1589 (1971), after
that of the criminal rules, 44 OHIO BAR 1183 (1971).
24See 40 OHIO BAR 1434 (1967).
25 The size and shape of the uniform traffic ticket posed even greater problems than its content.
Most police departments argued in brief that their file drawers would become useless and
have to be replaced at great expense.
[Vol. 23:32
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State v. Mapp26 and certiorari had just been granted by the Supreme
Court of the United States for its review as Mapp v. Ohio. When the
drafting committee presented its report, drawing objections from
police agencies, the Court decided to hear the objections by argument
in open court. The agencies were not timid in showing their resent-
ment of the interference of court rules with their cherished practices,
perhaps in anticipation of the release of the opinion in Mapp,27 and
certainly in anger at the drafting committee's unwise reference to
Cleveland traffic ticket fixing scandals then going on. The Court
denied the motion for adoption of the rules and added police represen-
tatives to the committee. A second submission, in July of 1961, brought
no better results. By that time the opinion in Mapp, with its criticism
of the largest police department in the state, had just been released.
Six months later, while the Court still held the motion for rules
adoption under advisement, the chairman of the drafting committee,
then a Common Pleas judge, decided a case in Cleveland contrary to
police contentions. Shortly thereafter, he resigned his post as drafts-
man. 28 The fact that the resigned chairman had, in the case in ques-
tion, chosen to extend the Mapp doctrine, may have had something
to do with the "lack of unanimity of police agencies" which the Court
cited as its reason for declining to adopt the rules "at this time.
29
In any event, nearly five years were to elapse with inaction on the
authorized rules until, on the eve of the submission of the Modern
Courts Amendment, the reorganized drafting committee submitted a
slightly amended and re-entitled draft of the rules which the Court
adopted as the Uniform Traffic Rules. 30 These rules, adopted in 1967,
have remained in effect through the Modern Courts Amendment and
beyond. They have been confirmed in their effectiveness in their limited
area even under the recently effective Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and stand not only as the rules longest in existence in Ohio, but those
least challenged by litigation.
No claim can be made for the comprehensiveness of the mistitled
Uniform Traffic Rules. They operate in a small segment of the crim-
inal process and they are just what they purport to be: provisions to
correct oversights in the 1959 legislative scheme of misdemeanor
26 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960).
7Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 The case, State v. Miller, (unreported) No. 74750 Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
was decided November, 1961; the resignation took place January, 1962; Journal Entry de-
clining to adopt the rules was entered February 14, 1962.
2 The extension of Mapp involved instructing a jury not only to disregard a lineup identifica-
tion in a larceny case, because made after a defendant had been held by police without op-
portunity for bail for four days, but to disregard the subsequent in-court identification if they
found it the product of the lineup identification.
30 40 OHio BAR 1434 (1967), adopted December 4, 1967, to be effective January 1, 1968.
1974]
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arraignments, motion practice, continuances, and trial consolidations,
plus provision for uniformity of chargings, notices, and dispositions
of traffic cases in the limited jurisdiction courts. No authority has
claimed for them any special achievement in the more engaging fields
of felony arraignment and trial, but they stand as the underrated first
achievement in uniform rule making by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The Rules of Civil Procedure
After the adoption of the Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio
constitution in the spring of 1968, the Supreme Court's former lei-
surely approach to rule making ceased, but it was not any further
simplification of the criminal process which was the first order of
business. The criminal rules, most controversial of the many practice
rules to be adopted in a three year time span, were also the last on
the Court's list.31 Instead, work was immediately begun on the draft-
ing of rules of civil procedure with the objective of meeting a dead-
line of January, 1969. This deadline for their submission to the leg-
islature, as required by the amendment, was necessary to make them
effective in July of that year. 32 The deadline was (perhaps fortunately)
missed, since in the short space of time available, a drafting commit-
tee could scarcely have been expected to do more than present the
thirty-year-old Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with a few appro-
priate changes of language to adopt them to Ohio use. But the federal
rules themselves were at that time in the course of amendment, and
an extra year of study enabled the Ohio rule draftsmen to study the
proferred federal amendments in connection with their drafting
problem. Ultimately, it gave an opportunity to the criminal rules
draftsmen for additional study in how the new rules, adopted in 1970,
would work in their new setting.
To understand the influence of the Federal Criminal Rules on the
new Ohio Rules, which conform to the Federal Rules at least in num-
bering, it might seem tempting to follow them rule-by-rule, noting
changes, adoptions, and departures as they occur. But this approach
would ignore the history of why the Ohio draftsmen chose to tinker
with the model. The history of the changes wrought by the drafts-
men of the Ohio Civil Rules on their federal model, gives some in-
sight into the reasons for the later changes. In adopting the civil rules,
Ohio had the benefit of more than thirty years of federal court
experience, and occasional amendment of the federal rules as experi-
ence proved amendment necessary. It might be thought that there
was little need for change in the model to adopt it to Ohio use, but
this was not to be. The Ohio drafting committee made major changes
in no less than twenty-eight of the first sixty federal rules. These
31 See supra note 23.
32 See Harper, Foreword to MCCoRMAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE, at v. (1970), prepared
by Professor Stanley Harper, Staff Director, Rules Advisory Committee.
[Vol. 23:382
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changes were of three types: those which went beyond the realm of
procedure by attempting to change the law of jurisdiction and venue;
those which went out of their way to preserve existing practice quirks
eliminated by the federal rules; and those which added a multitude of
operational detail to the rules so that every specific situation likely
to arise might be expressly, not merely generally, covered for the
guidance of the lawyers and judges (implying that Ohio judges could
not be trusted to apply general language to specific situations).
In the first group of Ohio civil rule departures from the federal
model, fortunately not repeated in the criminal rules, there occurred
an unfortunate misreading of the concept of in personam jurisdiction
and a confusion of it with venue, despite the fact that the model rules
had conspicuously avoided passing on either problem for more than
thirty years. 3  Ohio Civil Rule 1 (A) both extends the application of
the civil rules to "all courts of this state," and limits their application
to that "in the exercise of civil jurisdiction." Rule 82 goes farther to
declare that "[these rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state." Within the framework
of these restrictions the committee recommended, and the Supreme
Court adopted, Rule 4.6 (A), which provided that all process might
be served anywhere in the state; Rule 3 (B), that any action may be
"venued" [sic] in any court in any county; and Rule 3 (G), that the
rule related to venue was not jurisdictional. These three rules, taken
together, made no change whatsoever in the jurisdictional powers of
the common pleas court. Their exercise of in personam jurisdiction
has always been statewide with only venue, or the place of trial, as the
limiting factor. But the limited jurisdiction courts, particularly the
municipal courts, were not so situated. As to them, in personam juris-
diction has long been limited by the statutes creating them to civil
actions "in which the subject matter (res) of the action or proceed-
ing is located within the territory, or when the defendant or some
one of the defendants resides or is served within the territory."
'
Thus the effect of Rule 4.6 (A) and Rule 3 (G), confused as the
language was and despite the self limiting rules, appeared to enlarge
the in personam jurisdiction of the limited jurisdiction courts and to
make their process not only servable but effective to confer jurisdic-
tion throughout the state of Ohio.3 The appearance became a reality
when the Court in Morrison v. Steiner36 effectively abolished the stat-
33 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are entirely silent on the question of venue, which is
left to be determined by 28 U.S.C. §§1391, 1392. Territorial limits of effective service are fixed
by Rule 4 (f) as the state lines of the state in which the federal district is located, except in
the case of additional and third party defendants where a hundred-mile rule is in effect.
34 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1909.19 (D) (Page 1968).
3 OHIO R. Clv. P. 4.6 (A); see J. MCCORMAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE §3.24, at 44
(1970).
3632 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972).
1974]
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utory limitations on in personam jurisdiction by denying that there
was any such concept as in personam jurisdiction for municipal courts.
It held that if a court, any court, had subject matter jurisdiction and
venue was proper, no impediment to a valid judgment existed. 37 The
opinion of Justice Herbert, concurred in by a unanimous court, dis-
posed of the whole question of in personam jurisdiction in four quick
sentences:
Appellant contends that Civ. R 3 (B) cannot constitu-
tionally provide for the issuance by a municipal court of ser-
vices beyond its statutorily prescribed territorial boundaries.
However, appellant misconceives the nature of municipal
court subject matter jurisdiction (as opposed to territorial
boundaries) and how the Rules of Civil Procedure operate
within the limits imposed upon that jurisdiction by the Gen-
eral Assembly.
Subject matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power
to hear and decide a case upon its merits, while venue con-
notes the locality where the suit should be heard. Subject
matter jurisdiction defines the competency of a court to
render a valid judgment in a particular action.m (Citations
omitted)
Undoubtedly the General Assembly was guilty of poor use of lan-
guage when it specified in Section 1901.19 (D) of the Ohio Revised
Code that the municipal courts had jurisdiction in actions in which
the subject matter of the action was located within the county, when
it obviously meant the subject of the action or res was so located.
Subject matter as a jurisdictional concept has no tangible substance
and therefore is incapable of physical location. This should have been
obvious to the Court, even without considering the latter part of the
same sentence used in the statute: ". . . or when the defendant or
some one of the defendants resides or is served with summons within
the territory." The concept of limited territorial in personam juris-
diction of the municipal (and county) courts as a distinct non-pro-
cedural matter had been recognized by the Court in 1955 in Gibson
v. Summers Construction Co.,3 and in numerous cases thereafter.
4
37 The opinion in Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972) is devoid of
any mention of the term "in personam jurisdiction." MCCORMAC, supra note 35, at 44,
makes the bald statement: "The right to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant
anywhere in Ohio is thereby broadened from only particular actions to all types of actions
in all Ohio Courts." (emphasis added).
132 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 290 N.E.2d 841,842 (1972).
39 163 Ohio St. 220, 126 N.E.2d 326 (1955).
4 0 Rose v. Associates Discount Corp., 169 Ohio St. 321, 159 N.E.2d 459 (1959); McElfrish v.
Meloy, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 341, 146 N.E.2d 650 (Ravenna Muni. Ct. 1957). The confusion
caused by the misuse of the term "subject matter" in the statute is evident in the opinions in
Gastaldo v. Parker Appliance Co., 173 Ohio St. 181, 180 N.E.2d 589 (1962); Jacubenta v.
Dunbar, 120 Ohio App. 249, 198 N.E.2d 674 (1964); and Carbin v. Major, 8 Ohio Misc.
176, 221 N.E.2d 488 (Akron Muni. Ct. 1966).'"
[Vol. 23:32
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
BACKGROUND OF DRAFTSMANSHIP
It is thus difficult to believe that neither the Advisory Committee nor
the Court was aware, both in adopting Rule 4.6 and in the Morrison
decision, that they were trespassing on jurisdiction (and hence for-
bidden) territory. Certainly the Court, if not the Committee, should
have been aware before Morrison, of Chief Judge Leddy's comments
on attempting to alter substantive right provisions of a statute by
adopting and interpreting purely procedural rules. 41
The venue changes as determined in Rule 3 (D) stand on an
entirely different footing. This is procedural territory in which the
Court could, and did, romp at will. There was cause in Ohio for re-
moving some of the more absurd restrictions on venue, imposed a
generation ago, which gave selection of the wrong venue, or place of
trial, the consequences of jurisdictional failure.4 While the Supreme
Court of the United States has always wisely elected to stay out of
the venue field in its procedural rule making, possibly the Ohio venue
morass was so bad that the Ohio Supreme Court felt in all conscience,
that it could not remain aloof from it. The question was not one of
power, but of judgment in how far to go in correcting the situation.
The end result was that the Court, at the behest of the drafting com-
mittee, its staff and its consultant, went all the way in the "new con-
cepts"41 espoused by the consultant, and made venue almost entirely
a matter of plaintiff's choice. Experience under the rules indicates
that plaintiff's choice is almost invariably the plaintiff's place of resi-
dence regardless of any argument to be made on behalf of a more con-
venient forum. Just as in New York and California, the courts have
opted for plaintiff's choice of his home forum in interstate litigation."
In the area of tinkering with the results of thirty years of ex-
perience with the federal rules, as related to civil trial practice, the
Ohio draftsmen managed to try no less than five major departures.
The first of these was a crude redrafting of Rule 16, governing pre-
trials. Under the progenitor system this rule had been allowed to
develop as a flexible tool, with each individual judge using it in ac-
41 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (1971).
"We reach our decision today with great reluctance. For if a construction of
Rule 23 were controlling rather than the phrase 'amount in controversy' in the
jurisdictional statute, our decision would be different." For a position comparable
to the Ohio Court's position, see dissent of Timbers, J. at the Second Circuit level.
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 at 1038, 1039 (1972). The Leddy
view prevailed. Zahn v. International Paper Co. ..... U........ 94 S. Ct. 505
(1973).
42 Glass v. McCullough Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505. 112 N.E.2d 823 (1953); Bucurenciu
v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927); ct. Maggi v. Johnson, 200 Okla. 361,
194 P.2d 854 (1948).
43 McCormac, Venue- "New" Concepts in Ohio, 39 U.CIN.L.REv. 474 (1970).
"Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1969); Barrios v. Dade County, 310
F.Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Turner v. Evers, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973); Simpson v.
Lockman, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 234 N.E.2d 699 (1967); Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111,269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
1974]
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cordance with his particular expertise and personal habits to simplify
issues, to gain stipulations of fact, to order the course of trial, and
frequently to achieve settlements. The Ohio approach was to add
rigidity to the procedure by stifling individual variances. Instead of
granting the individual options to the judges, the Ohio rule infer-
entially permits a pretrial conference only if a majority of the judges
in a multi-judge court desire to impose it. It then requires the course
of the pretrial to be fixed by a local rule, uniform in its application
to all the judges.45 The rule makes the foremost of its objectives the
settlement of the case, an objective which Justice Brennan who helped
to design the New Jersey pretrial system, and Professor Rosenberg
who surveyed it, agreed was the least worthwhile of the objectives
and the least likely to be achieved at pretrial conference 6 The Ohio
rule follows with four stated objectives, none of which were included
in the federal model, and three of which are exceedingly minor and
pedestrian.7 But the fourth addition, that of enabling the court to
reserve the imposition of sanctions for evading or refusing discovery,
completely nullifies the basis of the conference as a meeting of fully
informed and prepared adversaries with the judge. For a pretrial
conference to be anything more than a generalized meeting for idle
chatter it is essential that discovery be complete so that counsel are
both informed of their adversaries' cases and in position to inform
the judge of settlement possibilities and length of trial if not settled.
To his credit, Dean McCormac, the consultant to the Court, attempted
in his practice book on rules procedure to emphasize that information
must be complete by pretrial time,4 and that settlement discussion
should be the last, not the first of the objectives.4 His views apparently
did not prevail with the committee and the Court.
The remaining "improvements" on federal rule theory consist of
retaining the unqualified right of attorneys to romance the jury panel
on voir dire, which the federal rules permit the judges to restrict or
eliminate, 0 of abolishing the highly successful institution of the spe-
45 OHIO R.CIv.P. 16: "A court may adopt rules concerning pre-trial procedure to accomplish
the following objectives: ( 1) the possibility of settlement of the action .... "
46 Remarks of William J. Brennan at the ABA Section on Judicial Administration, Aug. 23,
1955, reprinted 17 F.R.D. 479, 484-85 (1955); M. ROSENBERG, THE PRE-TRIAL CONFER-
ENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 68 (1964).
47 The additional objectives peculiar to Ohio in Civil Rule 16 are: " (3) Itemizations of expense
and special damages; (5) The exchange of reports of expert witnesses expected to be called
by each party; (6) The exchange of medical reports and hospital records; (7) The limita-
tion of the number of expert witnesses."
48MCCORMAC, supra note 32, §11.02 at 281, 283: "It is recommended that the court order all
discovery to be completed prior to a pre-trial conference."
49 Id. "Settlement is really a byproduct of a well conducted pre-trial conference rather than an
end in itself. The judge should encourage settlement but should not force litigants to
settle .... "
50 Compare OHIO R. Civ. P. 47 (A) : "The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to
conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In
(Continued on next page)
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cial verdict, merely because some Ohio judges had handled it woodenly
and given offense to eminent counsel in so doing,51 of continuing the
wasteful and unrealistic system of permitting prevailing counsel to
draft findings of fact and conclusions of law in trials to the courts,"
and finally of omitting the federal requirement that the basis of a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, dealing primarily
with the omission of an essential legal element of proof, had to be
raised by motion for directed verdict at trial, thus perpetuating the
Ohio tradition of trial from ambush. 53
But despite the dubious nature of the foregoing improvements
on the federal model, perhaps the greatest disservice the Ohio drafts-
men performed on the Ohio rules was the addition of quantities of
additional verbiage, which appear to accomplish little in clarity of
expression. Extreme examples are the process rules, which in the
federal rules rendition take 149 lines of type and in the Ohio version
342 lines, 4 the compulsory joinder rule,5" 37 lines in the federal ver-
sion and 72 lines for Ohio, the principal perpetuation of evidence and
discovery rule 6 with 74 lines of type for the federal and 96 lines for
(Continued from preceding page)
the latter event the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the exam-
ination by further inquiry." (emphasis added) with Federal Rule 47 (a): "In the latter
event the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by
such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper." (emphasis added).
51 OHIO R. CIv. P. 49 (C): "Special verdicts abolished. Special verdicts shall not be used."
Special verdict authority under the Ohio General Code and Ohio Revised Code provi-
sions had been subject to frequent amendment, culminating in the amendment of OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §2315.14 (Page Supp. 1955) to reflect that the special verdict did not
make findings of fact but findings on "determinative issues." In Miller v. McAlister, 169
Ohio St. 487, 160 N.E.2d 231 (1949), the trial judge had submitted findings on what the
Supreme Court viewed as evidenciary matters. In reversing, the Court's opinion Zimmerman,
J. was at pains to specify what the determinative issues in a negligence case were and to
draw a model special verdict form for such cases for the future guidance of trial judges. Later,
in Sudia v. Dietrich, 6 Ohio St.2d 160, 216 N.E.2d 882 (1966), a trial judge let counsel
argue a negligence action to the jury and then, only after the argument was concluded, did he
determine on his own motion to submit a special verdict. The opinion reversing for failure
to make his decision a timely one, contains much criticism of his conduct which "tends to
weaken the relationship between judge and counsel which is an essential attitude of a
court ....
52 OHIO R. CIv. P. 52: ". [Wihen a request for findings of fact and conclusion of law is
made, the court, in its discretion, may require any or all of the parties to submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law .... " For criticism of such a practice see Hansen,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, an Outmoded Relic of the State Coach Days, 32
A.B.A.J. 52 (1946).
' OHIO R. Civ. P. 50(B) differs from Federal Rule 50 (b) primarily in the introductory clause.
Ohio Rule 50 (B) provides: "Whether or not a moton to direct a verdict has been made or
overruled and not later than fourteen days after entry of judgment a party may move . ...
5 It could be argued that the additional verbiage was necessitated by the fact that Ohio Civil
Rules 4 through 4.6 govern a greater number and more diversified types of courts than the
corresponding Federal Civil rules; however, the author feels such an argument untenable.
See text at notes 37-40, supra.
5 OHIO R. Crv. P. 19 & 19.1.
56 OHIO R. Civ. P. 26 & 27.
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Ohio. The nature of the additions are in some cases amusing, since
the additional verbiage is to correct over-technical or uninformed in-
terpretations that Ohio courts had previously given to Ohio statutory
procedure. A case in point is the so-called Hudzik paragraph of Rule
8 (H), requiring a disclosure of defendant's incapacity. It resulted
remotely from the Supreme Court's successful attempt to protect a
young plaintiff's attorney from the results of his carelessness in the
early years following Ohio's adoption of the single cause of action
theory as pronounced in Rush v. Maple Heights," when the attorney
simultaneously sued his assumed two causes of action in separate
courts. The ruling was that defendant's counsel had the somewhat
unusual duty of informing plaintiff of his error and that if he did not
do so, he had waived any objection to the splitting of the cause of
action.58 Following this unusual reported decision, a Court of Appeals
applied the same logic to another liability carrier's counsel, whose
defendant, then a minor, was sued and served as an adult.5 9 This
time the Supreme Court did not see defendant's counsel's duty in the
same light and, in Hudzik v. Alcorn6 0 approved a dismissal of the ac-
tion, notwithstanding that the General Assembly had, in the mean-
time, passed two statutes to correct such a situation, one requiring the
disclosure of incapacity,61 the other permitting service on minors in
such cases as if they were adults.6 12 Thus the Hudzik decision became
inoperative as to future cases from the moment of its rendition and
the special statute overruling it became Rule 8 (H), and its com-
panion statute on minor service became Rule 4.2 (2). Both statutes
were later repealed in 1971 as material covered by the Rules of Civil
Procedure.6 3
As will later be discussed, jurisdictional misconceptions furnished
no problem for those who synthesized the Ohio criminal procedure
rules from the federal rules, nor did the assumed need of preserving
Ohio's tricks of "trial from ambush" cause them any difficulty. But
the prolixity problem created by attempting to devise a specific cure
for each specific fault in the previous Ohio criminal practice did
haunt the criminal rule draftsmen. One result is the extortionate
length, verbiage, and detail of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure.
57 167 Ohio St. 211, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958).
-8 Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375, 199 N.E.2d 869 (1964).
59 Hudzik v. Alcorn, No. 4441 Court of Appeals, Mahoning County (unreported 1964).
604 Ohio St.2d 45, 212 N.E.2d 419 (1965).
61 131 LAWS OF OHIO 648 (1965). Section 2309.261 OHIO REVISED CODE.
62 131 LAWS OF OHIO 666 (1965). Section 2703.131 OHIO REVISED CODE.
63 The repeal was in 1971 as part of Omnibus Bill, repealing sections of the statute covered by
the Rules. For recitals in Omnibus Bill, see Section 3, of House Bill 1201.
pocket parts to Pages Revised Code Annotated.
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Appellate Rules and Rules of Superintendence
In the list of borrowings and adaptations for the Ohio rules
structure prior to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, there was of
course, that of the Appellate Rules. But with a single exception, the
problems of adaptation had little impact on the criminal procedure
studies. This exception involved the necessity for adding verbiage to
overrule a particular case. It is reflected, like the Hudzik paragraph,
in a single added sentence to Appellate Rule 4. The federal appellate
rules have permitted notice of appeal to be filed "within thirty days
of judgment." Ohio adopted the same language, thus unifying what
had been a diverse series of time limitations between civil, felony,
and misdemeanor appeals ;6" but Ohio also found it necessary to inter-
polate a strange sentence specifying that a notice of appeal filed before
the entry of judgment "should be deemed to be filed" on the day of
judgment and immediately thereafter. The rule thus cured for the
future one of the more egregious examples of establishment injustice
suffered by campus militants in an early prelude to the Kent State
tragedy. In this earlier episode an ex parte injunction, issued to pre-
vent rioting, had arguably been violated by militants and a trial and
finding of contempt was made within a few days of the episode."
Notice of appeal immediately followed the oral pronouncement of
sentence from the bench. Prevailing counsel then merely held up the
journal entry of sentence for eighteen days, filed it, waited for appeal
time from the journal entry to run, and moved to dismiss the original
appeal as prematurely, and hence improperly, taken.6 7 The Court of
Appeals immediately granted the dismissal motion in a rather inept
opinion to which was attached a scathing concurrence by the resi-
dent appellate judge, criticizing appellants' counsel." Thus to assure
that no repetition of such a farce should occur, the otherwise appar-
ently unnecessary sentence was added to the appellate rule.
The impact of the Ohio Rules of Superintendence on the later
rules draftsmanship is somewhat different. Here there were no fed-
eral rules to copy from, to improve upon, or to stultify with particular
64 FED. R. App. P. 4 (a).
65 OHIo R. App. P. 4 (A), and OHIO R. App. P. 4 (B), unlike the corresponding Federal rules,
use the same thirty (30) day measure for civil and criminal appeals. Formerly the statutory
time for civil cases had been twenty days; for felony cases, thirty days; and for misdemeanor
convictions in limited jurisdiction courts, ten days.
6State ex rel. Trustees of Kent State Univ. v. Emmer, No. 37953 (Portage Cnty. C.P., Ohio,
1969).
67 State ex. rel. Trustees of Kent State Univ. v. Emmer, No. 410 (Ct. App. 11, 1969). Hearing
and oral finding were on April 22, 1969 as was the Notice of Appeal. The Journal Entry im-
posing sentence was filed on May 5, 1969; and Motion to Dismiss was filed on June 6, 1969,
in the Court of Appeals.
6The unpublished one page per curiam opinion cited two cases in support of its ruling on the
motion. One of them, In re Fenwick, 110 Ohio St. 350, 144 N.E.269 (1924), had nothing
to do with appeal time. The other case, State v. Avery, 119 Ohio App. 402, 200 N.E.2d 710
(1962), involved a deliberate choice by the appellate court to dismiss the appeal in prefer-
ence to writing an elaborate opinion of affirmance which the court indicated it would other-
wise have done- having considered the merits of the case.
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paragraphs directed to the solution of minuscule problems. But there
was a borrowing involved, this time from Portland (Multnomah
County), Oregon and there was a concept to be borrowed, and if
possible improved upon: the use of the so-called unlimited individual
judge's docket, also used in many federal district courts. There was
also a measuring stick to be used: the maximum time or "norm,"
within which any given case of a particular type was expected to be
terminated, although not necessarily finally disposed of.
69
The concept of the "norm" time was apparently borrowed entirely
from Oregon since in the case of the United States district courts,
the Administrative office of the Courts which publishes statistics for
the system,70 is primarily concerned not with the time for disposition
of the slow-moving cases, but with the duration of the median or
average case in a rather limited classification of case types.7 1 Certain
of the Ohio Supreme Court's Rules of Superintendence were designed
to have an effect on the criminal rules, notably those rules dealing
with the permissible time span of cases. The Rules of Superintendence
had no drafting committee or staff as such, and the Supreme Court
of Ohio appears as the corporate draftsman. But the rules do have
an explanatory Implementation Manual appended as prepared by the
Director of the Ohio Legal Center, and in this sense the Ohio Legal
Center and the Administrative Director and his staff, may be regarded
as the committee for the purpose of explanatory notes and guides to
interpretation of what the Rules are intended to accomplish.
In terms of impact on criminal procedure, Superintendence Rule
1 sets the stage. Normally Rule 1 in any such series is a scope of
application statement, but in these rules the first rule contains the
following impassioned statement on the delay problem:
In an attempt to bring criminal cases to trial promptly,
it appears that more judges are being assigned to the crim-
inal branches of our larger metropolitan courts. One direct
result of this practice is to increase further the number of
civil cases pending in many of these courts. 2
The statement appears designed to justify the declaration of Rule 4
that all cases, civil and criminal, must be assigned individually to all
judges of the general division of a multi-judge court so that all such
judges would have an approximately equal number of both civil and
criminal cases assigned to them, effectively abolishing the criminal,
69 RULES OF SUPERINTENDENCE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Rule 5 (Page Supp. 1972) refers
to cases "pending for a period of time exceeding that specified as the norm . . . ," but does
not specify any time. Report Form A, included in the Implementation Manual issued by the
Ohio Legal Center Institute, specifies the "norm" for each of six categories.
70 See MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, Administrative Office of the Courts.
71 Median case pendency for civil and criminal cases are shown for each federal district by
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (1970).
72 RULES OF SUPERINTENDENCE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Rule 1 (A) (Page Supp. 1972).
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equity, and civil jury trial divisions of the larger metropolitan courts.
Unfortunately, while the first part of this Rule 1 statement was true,
the second part relating to the backup of civil cases was only partly
true. In the year 1969, at least half of the general duty bench was
assigned to the criminal division in two of the larger counties of the
state," with a corresponding decrease in the number of judges as-
signed to civil jury cases. Yet with fewer judges available for civil
dispositions, the disposition rate in those counties increased slightly
on a total basis, and quite sharply on a per judge basis. Logically this
should not have happened, yet on the Administrative Director's an-
nual summary for that year, it did! 4 The following year of 1970
proved to be a disaster in both civil and criminal dispositions. Most
courts, and particularly the larger metropolitan courts, fell behind
in the disposition of both classes of cases,75 thus prompting the heroic
measure of imposing the individual judge's docket as a cure. In any
event the Superintendence Rules which give priority treatment to
criminal cases, insure that not merely fifty per cent but one hundred
per cent of the general duty bench will be occupied, at least part time,
with criminal cases.
What the effect of more than doubling the number of judges deal-
ing with criminal cases will be on the effectiveness of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure is a matter of conjecture. Certainly there will
be twice as many metropolitan judges trying to learn and apply them-
selves to the new procedures, all at the same time, and thus twice as
many adjustments needed, with twice the opportunity for misinter-
pretation and error. If, as has been theorized, the disposition disaster
of 1970 was partly caused by problems of the judges' having to learn
and interpret the then-new Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 then a similar
problem may have arisen in the last half of 1973 as all judges strug-
gled to understand the new Criminal Rules, with the spectre of a new
substantive criminal code to cause learning problems in the year
1974. It is entirely possible that instead of the Rules of Superintend-
73See J. FRANCE, ORDER IN THE COURTS (1970), at 110 (Stark County) and at 121 (Cuya-
hoga County).
74 10 OHIO COURTS, 1969 Summary, at 10 (Administrative Director, S. Ct. of Ohio).
75 12 OHIO COURTS, 1971 Summary at 7-10 (for criminal cases) at 11-14 (for civil cases)
(Administrative Director, S. Ct. of Ohio). The multiple pagings are needed because the Ad-
ministrative Director, for reasons which may be entirely unconnected with a poor disposition
showing in that year, abandoned the previous practice of showing statewide totals of filings
and terminations in civil and criminal cases, commencing in the year 1970. Such totals must
be computed by the reader of the reports by adding the subtotals given for each of the eleven
appellate districts. In that year the totals for criminal cases were 21,990 cases filed and 20,519
disposed of for a net addition to pendency of 1471 cases, compared to a net increase in 1969
of 499 cases. As to civil cases the totals were 49,909 cases filed in 1970 and 45,042 disposed
of, a net increase in pendency of 4,867 cases, against an increase in 1969 of only 485 cases -
a ten fold increase in carryover in one year.
76 France, Order in the Courts Revisited, 7 AKRON L.REV. 5, 20 (1973).
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ence having an effect on the criminal procedure rules, the reverse
may be true, with both civil and criminal case dispositions falling off
sharply to reduce the gains made in case currency since January 1,
1972. 7 Nor would this be merely a short term effect, since recent
studies have indicated that even after three years of experience by
judges with the civil rules, the time span for disposition of personal
injury cases has not recovered from the 1970 low, nor regained even
the 1968 level of dispositions."'
A second effect of the Rules of Superintendence on criminal pro-
cedure, as laid down in the new rules, is that of the establishment
of dispositive norms under Rule 5 and made definite in Reporting
Form A incorporated into the rules. The "norms" established by the
reporting form were twenty-four months for personal injury cases,
six months for criminal and appropriation cases, and twelve months
for workman's compensation and all other cases. 79 While the meaning
of the term "norm" is unclear, it appears to represent the maximum
time from filing (or arraignment) that a case should be allowed to
pend without the recital of special reason from the judge to whom
the case was assigned. During the year 1973 it was strongly indicated
that the norm time for criminal defendants held in custody should be
reduced to three months. 80 The effect of the norm, if enforced, is not
only to give the criminal cases the clear preference they should have
with every judge, but to clear up a very serious omission made in
Criminal Procedure Rule 12 as drafted. The rule requires not only
that certain objections and defenses be raised before trial, but that
they should be made by motion within thirty-five days after arraign-
ment.81 It was apparently felt that with such a tight time span for
motion filing, the following language of Uniform Traffic Rule .11 was
unnecessary:
. . . where possible all such motions shall be made at the
same session of court or stated in writing in a single docu-
ment, to the end that successive motions will not be offered
at successive appearances for the sake of delay.
8 2
77 The gains as shown by Report of the Chief Justice, 46 OHIO BAR 755, 756 (1973), were
spectacular, with a reduction in criminal cases pending of 2356 cases in a one year period.
Figures published by the Administrative Director for the same period appeared to show an
actual increase in the number of cases pending over the same period, 16 OHIO COURTS, 1972
Summary, at 20. For reconciliation of the two sets of figures see France, supra note 76.
78 See the table entitled Composite Performance Chart Tort Case Filings to be found in
France, Order in the Courts Revisited, 7 AKRON L.REv. 5, 29 (1973).
79 RULES OF SUPERINTENDENCE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, Report Form A (Page Supp.
1972).
80 Address of the Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio, Ravenna, Ohio, March 5, 1973; Re-
port of the Administrative Judge, Common Pleas Court, Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 1,
1973, at 9.
81 OHIO R. CRIM. P. 12 (C) provides an exception for bills of particulars (Rule 7 (E); and for
discovery motions (Rule 16(F), both of which provide that the motion shall be made
within twenty-one days after arraignment, or as in Rule 12, seven days before trial.
2 12 Ohio St. 2d XV (1967).
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As far as the movants were concerned, the consolidation of mo-
tion language was probably unnecessary, but so far as some judges
are concerned a series of motions filed at different times invites a
series of separate decisions, also made at different times. There is a
real fear that some judges will wish to string out their motion deci-
sions over a long period of time, hearing argument on the second
motion only after the first has been decided, and so on. Weeks could
be consumed in such a process and it should be noted that no time
limits are placed on decisions in preliminary matters.83 Thus the
"norm" time, if strictly enforced, may become a needed whip to force
the abandonment of piecemeal decision-making on motions which
would otherwise delay the time of trial. If not enforced strictly, the
seriatim disposition of pre-trial motions may present a serious prob-
lem in promptness of decision.
The Drafting Solutions - 1972
Viewed against the backdrop of existing Ohio felony case han-
dling, the changes imposed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure are
almost monumental. At least two thirds of the rules themselves are
worthy of extended comment. But considered as the draftsman's prob-
lem of selection of sometimes conflicting ideas expressed among the
models available to them, the changes produced by selection, com-
bination, or rejection of all, were far fewer in number. The models
available were, of course, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which furnished the skeleton and numbering system; the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure, as a basis of some alternatives to the federal plan
and to accommodate the prejudices of local attorneys; the modern-
izing influences of the 1959 amendments to the arrest, preliminary
hearing, and trial of misdemeanors statutes; and finally, for what
their limited field of application was worth, the so called Uniform
Traffic Rules. The processes of selection, combination, and rejection
produced only three major changes of substance, two minor ones,
three curious provisions adding to the time span for case processing,
and ten lengthy additions of detail, some of which were mere borrow-
ings from statutory language to preserve the familiarity of the bar
with the vocabulary of the criminal process. The balance of the
changes, based upon the model of the Ohio Civil Rules, were dubious
efforts by extra language to provide a specific cure for each minor
83 This contrasts with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.21 (Page Supp. 1972), which specified:
"No continuance at any stage of the proceeding, including that for determination of a mo-
tion, shall extend for more than ten days .... " and with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2938.11
(F) (Page Supp. 1972) which reads: "Any finding by judge or magistrate shall be an-
nounced in open court not more than forty-eight hours after submission of the case to him."
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shortcoming in existing practice or for each manifested bad habit
among the existing bench and bar.
Major Changes of Substance
One of the more logical and generally approved major changes
in the approach of the new rules is that expressed in Rule 5, abolish-
ing arraignment before the magistrate as such, and forbidding the
taking of pleas at the initial appearance in a felony case. The decision
was necessarily a choice between the express requirements of Federal
Rule 5 (c) and the equally express requirements of Section 2937.06
of the Ohio Revised Code, enacted in 1959.8 However modern the
statutory provision may have appeared when it was approved by the
Ohio State Bar Association in 1958,8- and however desirable the end
it was to subserve in making the initial appearance a meaningful
and critical part of the criminal process, thus necessitating appoint-
ment of counsel for the indigent at that stage, the requirement of
entry of plea brought too many disadvantages without bringing as-
signed counsel any closer to being provided in that stage of prosecu-
tion. The advances in the 1960's in liberal thinking, with Mapp,86
Beck,87 Wade, 8 Miranda,89 and their extensions, made the statute a
curious anachronism, and what may have seemed a promising, if
devious, approach to a desirable end in 1958 was simply not tolerable
by 1972. The provision for a plea of guilty before the committing
judge, for which this author was at least partly responsible, should
die unmourned. Another portion of the same statutory revision, Sec-
tion 2937.02 of the Ohio Revised Code, has survived in the Rules in
almost its original verbiage at Rule 5 (A)'s first cautionary infor-
mation to the defendant.90 Still others, the finding on waiver, 91 the
8 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (c) provides: "'. . . the defendant shall not be called upon to plead .... "
and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.06 (Page Supp. 1972) provided: ". .. the court or
magistrate shall require the accused to plead to the charge. In case of felony only a plea of
not guilty or a written plea of guilty shall be received ..."
15 The provision was approved by the Council of Delegates at the 78th Annual Meeting Ohio
State Bar Association, beginning on May 22, 1958, at Akron, Ohio. Report of Criminal Law
Committee, with comments on the amended and new sections is published in 31 OHIO BAR
411-446 (1958).
8Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
87 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1963) rev'g State v. Beck, 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825
(1963). See also O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966), rev'g State v. O'Connor, 6 Ohio
St.2d 169, 217 N.E.2d 685 (1966). Doughty v. Sacks, 372 U.S. 781 (1963); McLeod v.
Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965), rev'g State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349
(1964).
8United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
89 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90 While the detail of the rights explained was rearranged in the rules, the only substantial ad-
dition is in Rule 5 (A) (2) providing for assigned counsel at the preliminary hearing level;
see note 85 supra.
9' Compare OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5 (B) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.09 (Page 1960).
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order of proceedings at the hearing,92 the second cautionary instruct-
tion,"3 and the statutory definition of probable cause for the purposes
of grand jury certification, 94 have been retained in the Rules as
against brief and rather elliptical language in Federal Rule 5 (c). A
final modification of the statutory procedure, 95 which was criticized
at the time of its adoption as entirely too loose, extends the time
limit in some cases for holding the preliminary hearing.96
A second major change involving departure from and rejection
of existing statutory law, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and even the Traffic Court Rules, permits and encourages objections
to the form and substance of an indictment to be made after arraign-
ment and plea instead of being waived by the plea itself.97 While the
change is defended as encouraging the defendant to consolidate all
motions, including those in abatement, in bar, for the suppression of
evidence, and for discovery, curiously there is no provision similar
to that of Federal Rule 12 (b) or of either the Ohio or Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or even of Uniform Traffic Rule .11,98 effectively
requiring the joinder of all then-available motions without regard to
consistency. Instead, different time deadlines for filing the various
motions are set,99 and it has even been suggested by commentary at
familiarization lectures on the rules that a motion to suppress evi-
92 Compare OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5 (B) (2) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.11 (Page 1960).
93 Compare OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5 (B) (3) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.12 (Page 1960).
94 Compare OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5 (B) (5) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.13 (Page 1960).
95 Former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.21 (Page Supp. 1972) provided that no continuance
'shall extend for more than ten days unless both the state and the accused consent thereto.
Any continuance or delay in ruling contrary to the provisions of this section shall, unless pro-
cured by defendant or his counsel, be grounds for discharge of the defendant forthwith."
Under former §2937.02 (1953), postponement of the hearing more than ten days had the
legal effect of a dismissal for want of prosecution. The change was commented upon in
Meletzke, The New Preliminary Examination in Ohio: A Historical Contrast, 20 OHIO ST.
L.J. 652, 662 (1960).
96 Rule 5 (B) (1) shortens the time to five days if the defendant is in custody, but lengthens
it to fourteen days if he is not. In addition the rule provides: "In the absence of such con-
sent by the defendant, time limits may be extended only as required by law, or upon a show-
ing that extra-ordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensible to the interests of
justice."
97 Compare OHIO R. CRIM. P. 12(C) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.06 (Page Supp.
1972).
9 Compare FED. R. CRIM P. 12(b) (3) : "The motion shall be made before the plea is entered,
but the court may permit it to be made within a reasonable time thereafter ... " with
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) and OHIO R. CIv. P. 12(B), which both provide: "A motion
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is per-
mitted." See also UNIFORM TRAFFIC RULE .17 (e) "... The entry of such appearance and
plea shall constitute a waiver of motions pursuant to Section 2937.06 Revised Code and
Rule .11 as fully as would a plea entered in person in open court."
99 OHIO R. CRIM. P. 12(C) sets thirty-five days after arraignment or seven days before trial
for ordinary motions. Rule 7 (E) and 16 (F) set the time at twenty-one days after arraign-
ment for bills of particulars and discovery motions, respectively.
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dence cannot be made before arraignment and plea. 100 The utility of
permitting a defendant to raise technical objections to the form and
substance of a charge after he has pleaded to that charge is not clear.
It patently runs counter to normal pleading order under the concepts
of both the civil and criminal procedural rules, and of statutory or
code pleading, civil and criminal. It gives rise to a rather peculiar
use of a non-bargained plea of no contest, permitting appeal there-
from after failure of any motion, 01 and it is doubtful that any time of
pendency of a criminal case will be saved thereby. This provision
must stand as one of the more questionable provisions for Ohio.
The last of the 1972 major changes of substance are those found
in Rule 23, dealing with both jury and non-jury trials. As to the jury
trials, the rule rather arbitrarily fixed the number of jurors in felony
and serious misdemeanor trials at nine, and for petty offenses at
six, in contrast to the traditional twelve. Granted the permissibility
of this approach under recent decisions relating to southern states
which have generally retained smaller juries for misdemeanor trials
in single court or minor court proceedings,102 it would seem to be
courting a constitutional argument to reduce the number of jurors
from the number traditionally required, as was proposed. While the
obvious reason was to save expense and time in the jury selection
process, which was the expressed motive in Halliday,113 it would seem
doubtful based on the Pabst studies in the District of Columbia 4 that
any substantial amount of time would be saved; and the experience
in the Southern District of Ohio0 s gives rise to some question as to
any monetary savings achieved by the reduction device. As to non-
jury trials, the provisions of Rule 12 (c) that the court may make a
general finding only, in contrast to the federal practice, seems rem-
iniscent of the previously discussed provisions of Ohio Civil Rule
49 (c) forbidding special verdicts in jury cases. Whether this is part
of a general effort to impose parochialism as against a federal rule
100 Discussion of attorney Swartz on Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, publication 82-73,
OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, 4.05 - 4.09, Youngstown, July 26, 1973.
101 OHIo R. CRIM. P 12(H).
102 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972);
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (the only case in this early series involving a
northern state).
10Cleveland Ry. v. Halliday, 127 Ohio St. 278, 281, 188 N.E. 1, 2 (1933).
104 Pabst, What Do Six Member Juries Really Save, 57 JUDICATURE 6 (1973). The author is
quite critical of incomplete or contradictory findings of a New Jersey study, Stoever, A
Comparison of Six and Twelve Member Civil Juries in New Jersey Superior and County
Courts, I.J.A., 1972.
105 Jury Utilization Studies, Five Midwestern U.S. District Courts, I.J.A. (1972) (unpublished).
Findings were that procedures of the clerk in determining numbers of jurors to be sum-
moned for twelve member panels were so tight that it was unlikely that financial savings
could be effected by reducing the number of jurors to be seated. Nonetheless, the district, in
the fall of 1972, adopted six member juror panels for civil cases.
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example, or is merely designed to protect the Ohio judges from getting
into trouble by getting ill-considered and press-pleasing reasoning into
the record on appeal, is not really known.
It should in fairness be pointed out, however, that when Ohio
devised rules covering venue as well as in person jurisdiction in civil
cases,1"6 it seems to have exhausted its desire for pioneering and to
have returned in the Criminal Rules to the traditional standoff atti-
tude of the federal rulemakers, evidenced by referring the question
of venue for criminal prosecution to statutory control.107
Minor Departures.
Among the minor departures of substance is the provision in
Criminal Rule 3 that the complaint, or basic charging document, may
be sworn to before any person entitled to administer an oath. Coupled
with the provision of Rule 4 that the warrant may be issued by the
judge, clerk, or officer of the court designated by the judge, the pro-
cedure varies widely from the federal model which limits the power
to take the oath to a commissioner or other officer "empowered to
commit persons charged."10 Such looseness is also a departure from
the apparent limitations of the 1959 reformed statutory procedure
which seemingly limited the oath taking to a magistrate or the clerk
of a court of record.1"9 For a time in the 1960's there was serious con-
cern that even extending the oath-giving authority to clerks who were
untrained in the law was inviting constitutional attack on the affi-
davits. A warrant based on the complaint could not be issued without
a preliminary finding of probable cause and the clerks as both oath
takers and warrant issuers were deemed incapable of making a prob-
able cause finding. Since the number of minor offenses for which
warrants could be issued is vastly greater in the state's limited juris-
diction courts than before U.S. Commissioners and federal magis-
trates, it was considered impractical for the limited jurisdiction judges
to handle such an imposing number of complaints. The problem was
complicated by the fact that the overwhelming bulk of non-traffic
offenses are committed, and suspected perpetrators are identified or
apprehended, after the normal daytime court of record hours. Nor
did Ohio want any part of using second class "assistant" judges or
the rotation of limited jurisdiction judges to night duty at police sta-
106 See text at notes 3 3-44 supra.
107 OHIO R. CRIM. P. 18(A).
108 FED. R. CRIM. P. 3.
109 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2935.09 (Page Supp. 1972). The author's experience as a muni-
cipal judge included some jousting with attorneys for complaining witnesses, even after
1959, who insisted on their rights to take the oath to a criminal affidavit and present the
completed affidavit to a deputy clerk with a demand for issuance of an arrest warrant.
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tions.11O The solution briefly hit upon was that of "an officer of the
court designated by the judge" to take the oaths and issue the war-
rants after court hours. The term as devised was the equivalent of
the southern "learned in the law" description of a person admitted to
the bar, and it was seriously contemplated by the rules draftsmen in
1971 that a corps of lawyers might have to stand by at the Clerk's
offices or police stations to take over the drudgery of oath taking,
determination of probable cause, and warrant issuance. Before even
the rules submitted in 1972 had run their gauntlet before the General
Assembly, however, the United States Supreme Court had decided in
Shadwick v. Tampa,"' that a clerk could be trusted to be a warrant-
issuing authority. The decision was followed by the Ohio Supreme
Court in State v. Fairbanks,"' and the emergency device of the of-
ficer of the court was rendered unnecessary and the clerk restored to
both his oath taking and warrant-issuing functions. Both the "any
person authorized to take oaths," and the "officer of the court" pro-
visions were retained in the rules, however without real need and
solely as a matter of convenience.
A second minor departure from the existing models was the
creation of a "no contest" plea for felonies as the apparent equivalent
of the federal nolo contendere, and the identically translated no con-
test plea for misdemeanors, (particularly traffic offenses) in the 1959
statutory revision. Unfortunately, it has different incidents and con-
sequences from those of either of its models. The 1959 statutory
draftsmen had in mind a form of plea which would foreclose entering
a defense to the charge, without at the same time being an admission
against interest or a collateral estoppel to deny civil negligence per
se in a typical automobile collision episode. As an alert commentator
pointed out at the time, the misdemeanor plea resembled the old
English "non vult" pleas much more than it did "nolo contendere."113
Some of the incidents of the misdemeanor plea were thoroughly mis-
understood by the practicing bar and the limited jurisdiction bench.
But under Criminal Rule 11, unlike Section 2937.07 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code, the entry of the plea is an admission of the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint although not usable as such in subse-
quent civil or criminal proceedings. The chief use of the "no contest"
110 Both practices are prevalent in Tennessee, the former in Nashville, the latter in Memphis
and Knoxville. See Effective Minor Courts: Key to Court Modernization, 40 TENN.L.REv.
29, 45-46 (1972-1973).
111407 U.S. 345 (1972).
112 32 Ohio St.2d 34, 289 N.E.2d 352 (1972).
113 See McGovern, 1959 Legislation Affecting the Minor Courts, 20 OHIO ST.L.J. 623, 632
(1959).
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plea in a felony case would appear to be as a switch plea after the
failure of a defendant to gain dismissal of a complaint or the suppres-
sion of evidence on a pre-trial motion.114
The third minor variance from the existing Models is the in-
clusion in Rule 43 of an additional subsection, permitting trial in the
absence of the defendant where his actions in the courtroom had been
disruptive and his removal ordered to permit trial to proceed in orderly
fashion.11 s Such an addition is merely good sense and anticipates a
similar addition to the Federal Criminal Rules.
Time Standards
The lengthening of permissible time spans allowed for certain in-
dividual actions is a puzzling feature of the new rules, which were
first being devised at the same time that the Supreme Court itself
was preparing the Rules of Superintendence with their Rule 1 refer-
ence to delay in criminal cases as the most pressing problem of the
courts.1 1 6 The principal opportunities for a more leisurely approach,
apart from those of pre-trial motion practice previously discussed,117
were in the area of new trial and arrest of judgment. Just why in
such cases it should be expected to take an Ohio lawyer twice as long
to reach his county seat courthouse as it does for him to reach the
more distant federal courthouse 18 is not clear, nor is it clear how it
comports with the statements of Superintendence Rule 1. The prob-
lem seems similar to the problem already discussed of additional time
allowances to the prosecutor in proceeding with a preliminary hear-
ing in felony cases.119 It is to be assumed, however, that since the
drafting committee for the Rules consisted primarily of prosecutors
and defense counsel, a compromise allowing each more time for his
particular problem was agreed upon, and the Supreme Court merely
approved the compromise without inquiring into its motivation. There
is, of course, precedent in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure for allow-
ing such additional time,120 which is equally inconsistent with the
"hurry up" spirit of the Superintendence Rules.
114 See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 12(H).
115 OHIO R. CRIM. P. 43(B).
116 "Delay in both criminal and civil cases is presently the most serious problem in the admin-
istration of justice in this state .... . OHIO SUPERINTENDENCE RULE 1 (A).
117 See text at notes 96-100 supra.
11 OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(B) New Trial -allows fourteen days for filing the motion, in con-
trast to FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (seven days). Similarly, Ohio Rule 34 allows fourteen days for
motion in arrest of judgment and Federal Rule 34 allows seven days.
119 See text at note 96 supra.
120 See OHIO R. CiV. P. 12 (A) (1) and (2) allowing twenty-eight days for a responsive plead-
ing or motion in contrast to FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (a)'s twenty days.
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The Prolixities
The seemingly endless adding of words on words, and then of
repeating them in different contexts, is the most striking feature of
the Criminal Rules as formulated. It should be observed, however, that
there are no obvious Hudzik2l or Emmer1 22 additions to cure specific
mistakes of the past. Rather, the volume of prose and its repetition
seems to be inspired by the fear that in presenting new concepts to
Ohio, unless they are dinned into the judges, defense lawyers, and
prosecutors, they will be overlooked and the old habits revived at
every possible opportunity. This is particularly true of the new ap-
proaches to pre-trial release, voluntary initial appearance, discovery,
and the always hard limitations for police to absorb: search and
seizure.
In the area of pre-trial release there is some mistaken thought
that Ohio, led by Cuyahoga County, has hit upon a revolutionary idea
which requires the abundance of verbiage given to it by Rule 46. This
is, of course, the acme of parochialism. The elimination, or at least
the downgrading in importance, of the professional bail bondsman
comes as a result of an experiment begun in this country with the
work of the Vera Foundation in New York many years ago. The term
"release on recognizance" without intervention of the compensated
professional surety is a long accepted one in Philadelphia, in many
northern cities, and in whole large areas of the southeast. It is only
in the volume of language used to describe the process that Ohio
could be said to be a leader. Some of the detailed language in Rule
46 appears to be necessary to prevent anticipated abuse, as in the
case of the clear command that misdemeanor defendants be released
on their own recognizance or a personal unsecured bond in all but
extraordinary cases. The impulse of many metropolitan police to use
a misdemeanor as a mere holding charge, while investigating the
defendant for a more serious one, has a long history in Ohio, and firm,
detailed, rules are probably necessary to break the habit. In addition,
the nature of control that many municipalities exercise over the limited
jurisdiction courts has fed their desire to make such courts a source
of income, or at least an offset to increased police department budget
drain. The volume of fines did not appear sufficient for this purpose
and as an alternative to "cafeteria courts," many municipal courts
drifted into the practice of taking cash bond for minor offenses in a
sum substantially higher than any monetary penalty by way of fine
1 Hudzik v. Alcorn, 4 Ohio St.2d 45, 212 N.E.2d 419 (1965), a situation subsequently dealt
with by a special addition to Rule 8(H), OHIO R.CIv.P.
122 See text at Appellate Rules and Rules of Superintendence, supra. State ex rel. Trustees of
Kent State Univ. v. Emmer, No. 410 (Ct. App. 11, 1969).
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to be imposed, then winking at the practice of forfeiting this bail to
avoid court appearance. It was good business but poor judicial public
relations.
As to bail in felony cases, it seemed necessary in the rule to em-
phasize that bail was simply to insure the presence of a defendant at
trial and not a device to protect the community from further harm or
a pre-trial punitive measure. This emphasis was probably needed to
cope with the express or implied criticism of the metropolitan press
to which the occasional episode of a man released on bail for one
offense, who then proceeds to commit another, represents not only
good reading for its subscribers but an object lesson on the softness
of courts to criminals. Limited jurisdiction judges are apt to be
highly impressed by such newspaper stories, and as a result bail has
frequently been set at a leved to insure retention of the defendant
in jail rather than to permit his release.
There is similar emphasis in the provisions of Rule 4, which re-
lates to the substitution of a summons for a warrant of arrest in cases
of responsible citizens who have nothing to gain from flight to avoid
appearance in court to answer minor charges. Part of the problem
is that some police agencies, distrustful of the courts' policy of pro-
bation, suspended sentence, and small fines, have hit upon pre-hearing
incarceration as an addition to such sentences in order to insure that
the misdemeanant "knows he's been in trouble." An illustration of
such an attitude, even after the effective date of the rules, was in-
sistance upon the arrest and "booking" of the mayor of Cleveland
for a rather technical assault complained of by one of his policemen
in July, 1973. Judges, particularly those of municipal courts, also
contribute to the abuse of the arrest process in such cases. As a
matter of the administration of the court, if not justice, it is easier
to have defendants hustled into the courtroom as prisoners than to go
through the experience of voluntarily appearing defendants, who fre-
quently arrive late or not at all.
To cure these influences it was deemed necessary to state the
preference for summons over warrant issuance, and to emphasize
repeatedly that preference in Rule 4 so that clerk, judge, and police-
man may opt for summons. In one respect the use of the term "sum-
mons," no matter who issues the document, is an important im-
provement on the old procedure. In the 1959 statutory amendments it
was felt that a summons was necessarily a document to be issued
by a court, not an enforcement agency, and that there might be
insufficient compliance with all summonses if some were issued by
police. Consequently the term "Notice to Appear" was used to de-
scribe the officer-issued summons. The new language represents a dis-
tinct improvement.
Another example of additional language in relation to the cor-
responding federal rule is that found in Rule 10 governing arraign-
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ment. Here once more there is a statement to the defendant of his
rights, in almost the identical language given him on initial appear-
ance in the limited jurisdiction court. Out of excess of caution there is
added to this rule the requirement that the defendant must be present
unless, as borrowed from Rule .16 of the Traffic Rules, all concerned
consent to his absence and a "not guilty" plea is entered. Much of the
explanation of rights is repetitive as to the desirability, if not the
necessity, of having counsel. As to assigned counsel for the indigent,
Rule 44 on two occasions uses the Supreme Court's constitutionally-
required adverbs, "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily" with re-
spect to the defendant's waiving counsel. In addition, Rule 44 repeats
the substantive rule that no confinement may be imposed for a petty
offense without the defendant's being represented by, of having
waived, counsel.
Verbosity reaches a high point in Rule 16, governing discovery.
The federal rule, detailed in itself, takes 86 lines of type, but the new
Ohio rule, in an effort to improve on the model, takes nearly 200 lines
to say virtually the same thing. Much of the additional language is
needed, it will be claimed, because of Ohio's new theory that the de-
fendant, by exercising discovery as to the case against him, subjects
himself to disclosure of similar evidence from his own file. It is true
that discovery within certain limits is reciprocal, but the Ohio rule is
different from the federal one only in degree. The latter is explicit on
exchange of reports and records and draws the line of non-disclosure
just short of data on witnesses, which Ohio now permits as a matter
of reciprocal discovery. It is really only in this rule that the Ohio
solution is not merely a guide but an exceedingly detailed blueprint,
so full of stated conditions and prerequisites that there is danger of
being bogged down in the detail of the conditions. Similarly Rule 7,
relating to the details of waiver of indictment, is much more labored
and detailed than in the corresponding federal rule. The rule is most
detailed and specific as to those amendments of the indictment or in-
formation which relate to the substance of the charge, even if they
are made during trial, and as to the want of jeopardy if the jury is
required to be discharged by reason of the amendments.
The final wordy rule is that relating to search and seizure -
Rule 41. Here is an amalgam of the federal rule, bits and pieces of the
prior Ohio statute modeled on it, 2 3 an effort to update and enlarge the
definition of objects of search, 24 and a reworking of the United States
Supreme Court decisions, notably Hayden.'" Any such combination is
123 Section 2933.23, 2933.24, 2933.241 as amended and enacted by Amended House Bill No.
418, 130 LAWS OF OHio 664-65, 1727 (1963).
124 OHIO R.CRIM.P. 41 (B).
125 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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certain to result in increased verbiage, and considering this, the Ohio
rule was kept in reasonably short compass. Additions to the federal
rule language are in section (B) opening up the objectives of search;
the Ohio case law additions appear in section (C) which requires a
statement of the factual basis for affiant's belief that the property is
at the location to be searched, but permits so-called reliable hearsay
to be used, as in Rule 4, relating to arrest warrants. The Ohio statutes
are also reflected in section (C) for the examination of the affiant
and additional witnesses by the issuing judge, and by the provision
for a record of that testimony. Some material correcting the statutes
is also contained in subsection (D), clearing up the matter of whom
may hold the evidence seized, pending trial of the case to which it
relates.
Notwithstanding some of the additions called for in trying to
combine federal rules, detailed Ohio statutes, reasonably current
United States Supreme Court decisions, and the current philosophy
of the Ohio Supreme Court, the end product of the Ohio Rules of
Criminal Procedure is less bulky in additions of useless language than
might have been expected with such a conglomeration of ideas. In
this department the criminal rules are a decided improvement upon
the three-year-old Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
The 1973 Changes
During the 1972 legislative session, the General Assembly of Ohio
rejected the Rules presented to it by the Court, thus giving additional
time for redrafting. Neither the reasons for the rejection nor the
text of the changes the Assembly desired, nor the concessions the
Court was reportedly willing to make to get the Rules adopted, were
ever made a matter of official record. Reportedly the legislators were
principally concerned about the pre-trial release provision, Rule 46,
with its "soft on criminals" approach, which was sometimes trans-
lated as the yielding of the legislators to the pressures of the pro-
fessional bail bondsmen. The rules as resubmitted in January, 1973,
did contain some changes dealing in detail with, or correcting over-
sights in, the previous offering. Significantly, however, on the point
of friction, the Court did not yield an inch on the conditions of pre-
trial release. The 1973 version of Rule 46 was more hard-line liberal
than its predecessor.
The redrafting produced only fifteen changes in the rules of any
significance; six were on matters of real substance, seven were essen-
tially additions of more detail and verbiage, and two were correc-
tions by adding subjects first omitted, probably by oversight.
Of the matters of substance, the principal changes were in down-
grading the importance of formalities in the case of misdemeanor
prosecutions. The most striking of these changes was the elimination
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of the provision in earlier Rule 46 that a policeman could prevent un-
secured pre-trial release of a defendant merely by filing a written
objection to it - a rather craven abdication of the right of the courts
to pass on conditions of release. For this provision was substituted an
elaborate subsection (D) providing for the ten per cent bail deposit,
a cash deposit or guaranteed arrest bond in accordance with a mis-
demeanor bail schedule (all borrowed from the 1959 arrest and deten-
tion amendments),126 or provision for credit card bonding. Allied to
this provision was an alternate citation procedure, set forth in Rule
4.1 for non-traffic misdemeanors, which essentially extended the Uni-
form Traffic Ticket procedure to non-traffic offenses. Another borrow-
ing from the Uniform Traffic Rules occurred in Rule 10, relating to
the presence of a defendant at his arraignment. The history of the
traffic rules had featured a determined attempt to break up the entry
of guilty pleas and payment of fines for the defendant by others,12 7
culminating in adoption of Rule .19. Apparently the rule draftsmen
in 1972 were convinced that this problem also existed in non-traffic
offenses, so Rule 9 (B) was added, requiring the presence of the de-
fendant at arraignment unless a "not guilty" plea was entered.
Two potentially contradictory changes were made in the 1973
submissions with regard to the formalities of writing. In Rule 44, as
resubmitted, the provision for written waiver of counsel was elim-
inated, although the other safeguards against pressure on a de-
fendant were not relaxed. But at the same time the provisions in Rule
31 regarding return of verdicts was redrawn to re-institute the stat-
utory requirements that a verdict must be in writing and signed by
each juror concurring therein.1 2 Finally a provision was made in Rule
32.2 that a copy of the report of presentence investigation of a de-
fendant should be transmitted to the agency exercising supervision or
confinement after his sentence.
There will be reasonable differences of opinion on whether the
number of jurors sitting on a defendant's case, or the number of chal-
lenges allowed, constitute matters of form or of substance. This author
chooses to regard them as matters more of form and detail. While the
draftsmen in Rule 24 (A) repeated the questionable provision of the
unqualified right to romance the jury panel on voir dire in both the
1972 and 1973 submissions,2 9 they displayed more abandon in toying
12 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2937.22 et seq. (Page Supp. 1972).
11 The history of the problem is recited in France, The Ohio Supreme Court's Traffic Court
Rules: A Beginning of Procedural Rule-Making, I AKRON L.REv. 1, 12-13 (1968).
'2 The provision contained in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2315.09 (Page 1954): "The verdict
shall be in writing and signed by each of such jurors concurring . . ." had previously been
accepted as controlling the form of criminal as well as civil verdicts, although before the
1950's a verdict signed by the foreman only, subject to a poll of the jury, had been accepted
by many courts, by form books, and incorporated in many standard charges of the court.
129 See note 50 supra.
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with the number of jurors in both submissions. The 1972 offering had
reduced the number of jurors in felony and serious misdemeanor cases
to nine and in petty offenses to six. The 1973 version of Rule 23 (B)
returned to twelve jurors in felony cases and eight for all misde-
meanors, in the latter case a reasonable compromise on a point of not
too much consequence. But Rule 24 (C) raised another distinction be-
tween felonies and misdemeanors by authorizing four peremptory
challenges for the former and only three for the latter, another great
decision of less than cosmic consequence.
Other matters which were changed include the elimination of a
juror's belief in capital punishment as a ground of challenge for
cause (Rule 24), expansion of the right to assigned counsel in parole
revocation hearings (Rule 32.3), some added detail on discovery (Rule
16), the insertion of a provision for authorization of any officer to
take the verification of a complaint (Rule 3),130 an expansion of the
definition of records required to conform to the Rules of Superin-
tendence (Rule 55), and a new provision giving express recognition
to negotiated pleas and requiring a record of the conditions thereof,
(Rule 11). In the correction of prior oversight, there appeared two
new rules of varying importance. One, Rule 27, provided reference to
the Rules of Civil Procedure for proof of records. The other, Rule 21,
correcting an omission in the civil rules themselves,"1 provided for
the transfer of trial of misdemeanor cases to limited jurisdiction
courts.
Conclusion
While the length and verbosity of the new Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure may be criticized by some, much of the length is necessary be-
cause police agencies and limited jurisdiction judges seem to require
that all "don'ts" be spelled out in considerable and unmistakable detail,
as experience in the operation of the Uniform Traffic Rules indicates.
In general, the Rules should prove workable; moreover, the draftsmen
have refrained from the excessive parochialism which has marred the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
One caution is entered, however. It seems curiously inconsistent
with the spirit of the Rules of Superintendence to allow twice as much
time for the filing of motions in arrest of judgment and for new trial,
130 See text at note 112 supra.
131 Prior to 1970, the Court of Common Pleas had statutory authority under OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §2305.01 (Page Supp. 1972) to transfer a civil case in which the amount sought by
the plaintiff did not exceed one thousand dollars to a municipal court for trial. This provi-
sion was not carried into the OHIO RULES OF CIV. P. However, the omission is not as serious
as one might expect for the above statute remained in effect after the enactment of the rules,
indicating that contrary to the attitude expressed in Rule 4.6 and the Morrison case, the
Court did recognize that some statutory jurisdictional provisions were exempt from the
tinkering process of the Rules. See text at notes 35-51 supra.
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and three times as long for an appeal in a criminal case, as is allowed
under the federal rules.1 2 In addition, the importation of the "season-
ally so as not to delay trial" concept as a pretended limitation on delay
in the disposition of preliminary motions (which replaced the ex-
press time requirements of the Criminal Procedure Act), the exten-
sion of time allowed for preliminary hearings, and the failure to
provide for consolidation of pre-trial motions, may have serious effects
in delaying criminal adjudications. These provisions may prove to be
the culprits if, as may occur, there is a slowdown in late 1973 and 1974
in criminal case processing resulting from the adoption of the rules.
13 For motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment, see note 118 supra. The extra time
allowance for notice of appeal is in OHIO RULES App. P., 4(B), allowing thirty days, in
contrast to FED. RULES App. P. 4(b), ten days.
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